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When a bank issues a letter of credit, it makes a binding
promise to the party to whom it sends the letter to honor that
party's drafts1 on it, when those drafts are accompanied by speci-
fied documents. Letters of credit traditionally have been used as a
method of paying for goods in international sales. For example, if
geographical distance or some other factor makes a seller of a piece
of equipment uncertain of its buyer's payment, the seller may in-
sist that the buyer's bank issue a letter of credit naming the seller
as beneficiary. After it ships the goods, the seller can draw on the
letter by presenting the bank with its draft and the documents
specified in the letter, which usually include a negotiable document
of title such as a bill of lading. The bank is obligated to honor the
draft regardless of any defenses to payment the buyer may have.2
In recent years, however, letters of credit have been used pri-
marily in a different way. Known as "guarantee" or "standby" let-
ters of credit, they are drawn upon if the principal means of pay-
ment fails.3 For example, a seller might agree to defer payment
until the buyer receives the goods, but insist that the buyer pro-
vide a standby letter of credit from the bank, in which the bank
promises to honor drafts when accompanied by the seller's signed
statement that the buyer has received the goods and has failed to
f Assistant Professor of Law, University of Chicago. My thanks to Bruce Bernstein,
Walter Blum, James Clark, Frank Easterbrook, Daniel Ernst, Thomas Jackson, and Robert
Weisberg for their helpful comments.
I A draft is a writing signed by one party unconditionally ordering another to pay a
sum certain to the order of a specified person or to the bearer of the writing. U.C.C. § 3-104.
The party signing such a document is a "drawer" and the one to which the order is directed
is a "drawee." Ordinarily, a drawee has no obligation to honor a draft on it. Id. § 3-409. A
letter of credit binds the bank to honor drafts when the beneficiary of the letter satisfies its
conditions. Id. § 5-114.
2 Fraud in the letter-of-credit transaction itself may be a defense to payment, but
otherwise the bank's obligation is absolute and independent of the transaction between the
seller and the buyer. See text and notes at notes 17-19, 51-55 infra.
3 See generally Joseph, Letters of Credit: The Developing Concepts and Financing
Functions, 94 BANKING L.J. 816, 818-19 (1977); Verkuil, Bank Solvency and Guaranty Let-
ters of Credit, 25 STAN. L. REV. 716, 721-24 (1973).
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pay for them.4 The bank receives a fee and usually acquires a se-
curity interest in the buyer's property in return for bearing the risk
of the buyer's default, but the bank does not have to give cash
unless default actually occurs. The seller extends credit to the
buyer while the goods are in transit, but it can rely on the credit of
the bank to ensure ultimate payment. The buyer is not obliged to
pay until it receives the goods.
Taking various forms, standby letters of credit have become
a standard feature of commercial transactions because the bank's
commitment under the letter is designed to protect the letter's
beneficiary from loss if the party with whom it has contracted de-
faults or becomes insolvent.5 A recent case, Twist Cap, Inc. v.
Southeast Bank,6 suggests, however, that a bankruptcy judge can
enjoin a bank from honoring a letter of credit after the buyer has
filed a petition in bankruptcy, if the bank's obligation to honor the
letter is secured by an interest in the buyer's property.7 In March
1978, Twist Cap entered into an agreement with the Southeast
Bank to secure any money paid by the bank on Twist Cap's behalf.
In December 1977, June 1978, and March 1979, the bank issued
standby letters of credit for Twist Cap's account that named as
beneficiaries two sellers to the company. In August 1979, Twist
4 Under letter-of-credit doctrine, the bank's obligation to honor the draft must be tied
to the production of a document. Its obligation cannot be triggered by an external event, nor
can it be put in the position of deciding whether the buyer has in fact defaulted. See
Wichita Eagle & Beacon Publishing Co. v. Pacific Nat'l Bank, 493 F.2d 1285, 1286 (9th Cir.
1974).
5 The value of outstanding letters of credit runs in the billions of dollars. See Note,
Judicial Development of Letters of Credit Law: A Reappraisal, 66 CORNEL L. RZv. 144,
145 n.9. (1980) (citing Second Meeting on the Condition of the Banking System: Hearing
Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
157 (1978)).
6 1 Bankr. 284 (Bankr. D. Fla. 1979).
* Id. at 285-86. This question arose infrequently before Twist Cap, perhaps because
courts faced with the issue tended to find that they lacked the power to enjoin a transfer of
money from one creditor to another, because such a transaction did not involve property
that was in the debtor's possession. See Postal v. Smith (In re Marine Distributors, Inc.),
522 F.2d 791, 795 (9th Cir. 1975). Twist Cap distinguished Marine Distributors on the
ground that that case did not involve a bank with a security interest in the debtor's prop-
erty. 1 Bankr. at 285. Under the new Bankruptcy Code, however, the question of the exis-
tence of the court's power is coextensive with the question of the appropriateness of its
exercise. 28 U.S.C. § 1471 (Supp. HI 1979). Bankruptcy courts have the power to issue such
injunctions if they are necessary or appropriate to carry out the Code's provisions. 11 U.S.C.
§ 105(a) (Supp. 111 1979); see In re Larmar Estates, Inc., 5 Bankr. 328, 330-31 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 1980) (bankruptcy courts have power to enjoin enforcement of a state judgment
against guarantors, but exercise of such power was not appropriate under facts of the case).
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Cap filed a Chapter XI petition;' soon thereafter it filed a com-
plaint and obtained an order restraining the bank from honoring
the letters. The court denied the sellers' motion to dismiss the
complaint and enjoined the bank from honoring the letters of
credit until it resolved on the merits the issue of whether honoring
them was a voidable preference.
Before Twist Cap no court or commentator thought that the
independent obligation of a bank to honor a seller's drafts would
be affected by the nature or extent of the bank's ultimate rights
against the buyer's estate. Now, however, the Twist Cap result
threatens to deprive the standby letter of credit of its basic advan-
tage-certainty of payment regardless of the intervening misfor-
tune of the other party-because banks are typically unwilling to
bear the risk of a buyer's default without a security interest in the
buyer's property. The decision already has disrupted the practice
of issuing commercial paper backed by a standby letter of credit.
Standard & Poor's now refuses to rate commercial paper of this
type,10 and as a result, transactions involving millions of dollars
must be executed differently, in ways that are usually more elabo-
rate and costly. These disruptions suggest that a thorough analysis
of the law governing standby letters of credit in bankruptcy is in
order.
Part I of this article describes the operation of letters of credit
in greater detail, focusing on standby letter-of-credit transactions.
Part H shows that a standby letter of credit is in principle indistin-
guishable from other financing devices that survive the filing of a
bankruptcy petition and suggests that, as a matter of policy,
standby letters of credit should be treated in the same way as their
functional equivalents.
Parts Ill and IV examine the Bankruptcy Code to determine
whether it treats standby letters of credit the same as their close
' The case arose as an arrangement under Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898,
ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (found as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-1103 (1976)) (superseded 1978).
9 A brief note of caution to lawyers recently appeared in the "Counsel's Corner" col-
umn of The Banking Law Journal. See Letter of Credit Collateral-A Spur to the Wary,
98 BANKGIN L.J. 579 (1981).
10 Standard & Poor's rating of commercial paper is now based solely on the
creditworthiness of the bank only when "(1) neither the commercial paper holders nor the
bank are secured, (2) both the commercial paper holders and the bank are secured by the
same collateral .... and (3) the commercial paper holders are secured, but the bank is
unsecured." N. Baron, Debt Supported by Irrevocable Letters of Credit, Irrevocable Com-
mitments and Note Purchase Agreements (press release issued by Standard & Poor's Corpo-
ration, June 1980) (on file with The University of Chicago Law Review).
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analogues. Part HI addresses the statutory question of whether a
bankruptcy trustee can enjoin the bank from honoring its letter of
credit, a question distinct from whether the bank can assert a se-
curity interest after it honors the letter. When the bank honors a
letter of credit, it merely shifts claims against the debtor's estate
from one creditor (the seller, the beneficiary of the letter of credit)
to another creditor (itself). The enforceability of the bank's secur-
ity interest affects the size of the debtor's estate, but the act of
honoring the letter of credit does not. For this reason, I argue that
honoring the letter is not a preferential transfer voidable by the
bankruptcy trustee.
Part IV addresses the more difficult statutory questions:
whether a bank that honors a letter of credit either within ninety
days before the filing of the bankruptcy petition or at any time
after the filing should have the status of a secured creditor when it
asserts claims against the debtor's estate. I show that both ques-
tions ultimately turn on when the debtor transferred an interest in
its property to the bank. One might argue that the transfer takes
place only when the letter of credit is honored, because only then
does the contingent claim of the bank against the debtor ripen into
a certain one. State law provides, however, that the transfer occurs
when the bank's security interest attaches and is perfected, events
that typically occur well before the ninety-day preference period. I
demonstrate that no specific provisions in the new Bankruptcy
Code commend a departure from the traditional rule that federal
bankruptcy law does not alter the structure of property rights
under state law.
I. THE LETrER-OF-CREDIT TRANSACTION
A. Background
As recently as twenty years ago, letters of credit were used
principally in international sales." No seller willingly sends its
goods across national borders unless it is confident it Wil be paid,
because no seller welcomes the prospect of having its goods in the
care of unknown parties in a foreign port, where finding a new
buyer may be impossible and bringing a legal action extremely dif-
" For a brief history of the letter of credit, see Kozolchyk, Letters of Credit, in 9
INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CoMPARATIVE LAW ch. 5, at 3-5 (1979) (published in a sepa-
rate fascicle as B. KOZOLcHYK, LETTERs OF CREDIT (1979)).
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ficult. The letter of credit as we now know it arose in the middle of
the nineteenth century in response to this problem.12
Although letter-of-credit transactions vary,13 their basic struc-
ture can be stated briefly. In a typical letter-of-credit transaction,
a seller specifies that payment be made with a letter of credit in its
favor. The buyer (known as the "customer" in the letter-of-credit
transaction) contracts with the bank to issue the letter. The bank,
knowing the creditworthiness of its customer, is willing to issue the
letter for a small fee, typically some fraction of one per cent of the
price of the goods.14 The bank sends the letter to the seller, prom-
ising to pay the full price of the goods when the seller presents it
with a draft and the documents specified in the letter. These docu-
ments typically include a negotiable bill of lading.
This arrangement benefits all parties to the transaction. The
seller can manufacture goods to the buyer's order, confident it will
be paid regardless of what befalls the buyer, because it can rely on
the bank's commitment. The buyer that secures the letter of credit
is better off than if it had advanced cash to the seller, because it
does not become liable for the price until a trustworthy party (the
bank) has possession of a negotiable document of title. The bank,
in turn, earns a fee for issuing the letter and exposes itself to only
a small risk, because it can readily assess the creditworthiness of
its customer and, as the holder of a negotiable bill of lading, it has
a perfected security interest in the goods involved in the
transaction.15
The linchpin of the letter-of-credit transaction is the unique
legal relationship between the bank and the beneficiary.16 Unlike a
12 Id. The modem commercial letter of credit should not be confused with the seven-
teenth-century letter of credit, under which the issuer promised to reimburse the payor,
without a right of action by the payee against the payor. See id. at 4.
13 A common variation is to have the buyer's bank persuade another bank that is
known to the seller to "confirm" its letter to the seller. A bank that confirms the letter is
bound to honor it in the same way as the issuer. For a discussion of the common variations
on the letter of credit, see H. HARFrELD, BANK CREDrrS AND Accm'TANCEs 29-55 (5th ed.
1974).
14 Id. at 58.
"' See U.C.C. § 2-505; J. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 18-1, at 707-08 (2d ed. 1980).
16 In their discussion of the legal relationship created by the letter of credit, Professors
White and Summers note that a letter of credit is not like other devices creating legal obli-
gations, but rather that
a letter of credit is a letter of credit. As Bishop Butler once said, "Everything is what it
is and not another thing." Thus, when a beneficiary sues an issuer for refusal to honor
drafts drawn pursuant to a letter of credit, his theory is not that of breach of contract,
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guarantor, the bank is primarily liable whenever the beneficiary
presents a draft and documents that conform to the letter.17 Un-
like its counterpart in a third-party beneficiary contract, the bank
may not invoke the defenses its customer might have on the un-
derlying contract.18 Moreover, the status of a beneficiary of a letter
of credit is radically different from that of a payee of a check, who
has no right to compel payment from the drawee bank. 9 In the
letter-of-credit transaction, the beneficiary does have the right to
compel payment, and once the letter of credit is issued, the cus-
tomer is powerless to stop payment in the absence of fraud. This
difference exists because a letter of credit, unlike a negotiable in-
strument such as a check, is a binding and irrevocable obligation of
the bank itself, not of the customer who procured it. The legal re-
lationship between bank and beneficiary is governed by special
principles which, like the law merchant in an earlier era, are nearly
uniform throughout the world. 0
B. The Standby Letter of Credit
The archetypal letter-of-credit transaction described above is
the mean~s by which the parties pay one another if the underlying
transaction takes place as planned. Standby letters of credit, in
contrast, are never drawn upon if the transaction runs smoothly.
For example, a builder might require a developer to have a bank
issue a letter of credit in its behalf to ensure payment if the devel-
oper defaults. Such a letter of credit might require that the bank
honor the builder's draft when accompanied by an architect's cer-
tificate that the building was finished and a statement by the
builder that it had not been paid. In this kind of transaction, the
bank usually will issue the letter only if the developer gives it a
security interest in some property to which the bank will have re-
course if the letter is drawn upon. If all goes well, the builder never
presents its draft because it has been paid on schedule by the de-
veloper. If the developer defaults, however, the builder is still as-
sured payment under the letter of credit. The bank then must seek
nor does he sue "on a negotiable instrument." Rather, he sues "on a letter of credit'
J. WHIrrE & R. SuMMERs, supra note 15, § 18-2, at 715 (footnotes omitted).
17 See id. § 18-2, at 714.
Is Bank of N.C. v. Rock Island Bank, 570 F.2d 202, 206 n.7 (7th Cir. 1978); H.
HARFqLD, supra note 13, at 163-65.
19 See U.C.C. §§ 3-401, -409.
"o See Kozolchyk, supra note 11, at 4.
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reimbursement from the developer or enforce its security interest.
The parties to this transaction might employ a standby letter
of credit in a different way. The developer might want to ensure
that any money it advances to the builder is used to build the
building. The developer could require the builder to have its bank
issue a letter of credit in the developer's favor. Such a letter might
provide that the developer's draft, accompanied by its statement
that the builder had defaulted on its obligations, would be honored
by the bank. Unlike the negotiable document of title specified in
the usual commercial letter-of-credit transaction, the documents in
the standby letter-of-credit transaction have no intrinsic value. For
this reason, the bank is likely to insist that the builder give it a
security interest as a condition of the letter's issuance.
Standby letters of credit also are used in transactions involv-
ing sales of goods. A supplier of raw materials, for example, might
prefer to have a letter of credit in its favor from the buyer's bank
rather than a security interest in the goods. Alternatively, a buyer
of manufactured goods might want to protect itself when it ad-
vances money to finance its seller's purchase of raw materials.
Such a buyer risks more in the event of default than one who sells
on credit, because the buyer cannot easily acquire a purchase
money security interest 21 in the raw materials its seller uses. As the
beneficiary of a standby letter of credit issued by the seller's bank,
however, the buyer obtains equivalent protection.
A business that wishes to raise money may issue commercial
paper backed by a standby letter of credit. This type of transaction
involves larger dollar amounts than other uses of letters of credit.
The business's bank may be more willing to accept the risk of its
customer's insolvency than will the buyers of commercial paper.
The buyers, however, may be willing to extend cash to the business
if they can rely on the bank to ensure repayment. The letter of
credit makes it easy for all of the parties to allocate among them-
selves the risk of the business's failure. The business acquires the
cash it needs, the bank lends its credit to the business without
having to supply cash, and the buyers of commercial paper enjoy a
relatively safe inVestment. As in the other letter-of-credit transac-
tions, all parties directly involved benefit.2 2
1 A purchase money security interest is a security interest taken or retained by a per-
son who enables the debtor to acquire rights in the collateral. U.C.C. § 9-107. The holder of
a purchase money security interest has priority over all other secured creditors. Id. § 9-312.
Standby letters of credit are also used in transactions involving industrial revenue
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II. STANDBY LETTERS OF CREDIT AND THEIR EFFECT ON THIRD
PARTIES
The benefits of standby letters of credit nonetheless may come
at the expense of other parties. A standby letter of credit becomes
important only when the contingency the beneficiary feared comes
to pass. The hard times that precipitated the default by the bank's
customer may culminate in bankruptcy proceedings in which other
creditors are involved. The rights of these creditors, both secured
and unsecured, may be affected by the letter-of-credit transactions.
Bankruptcy courts always scrutinize situations in which a
creditor is paid in full instead of its pro rata share of the debtor's
property.28 Although ordinary security interests are immune from
attack by the bankruptcy trustee,24 the standby letter-of-credit
transaction may seem to call for this kind of scrutiny, because the
beneficiary of a standby letter of credit has no notice requirement
to satisfy and is paid immediately in full in cash. Even secured
creditors who have filed financing statements and thereby have
given notice of their security interests must suffer automatic
stays25 and the possibility of cram downs.26 In the standby letter-
bonds and the sale of investment tax credits. Although in a particular case the benefits
derived by the parties from reallocating the risk through a letter-of-credit transaction may
be unclear, we should assume that the parties would not complicate their transaction by
bringing in a bank unless they thought they would benefit thereby, even after taking the
bank's fee into account.
23 See 2 G. GLMoRE, SECURIrY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 45.2, at 1287 (1965);
Jackson & Kronman, Secured Financing and Priorities Among Creditors, 88 YALE L.J.
1143, 1147 (1979).
U This discussion assumes that security interests in after-acquired property are not
involved. These are given special treatment under the new Bankruptcy Code. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 547 (Supp. m1 1979); note 68 infra.
25 Under section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 362 (Supp. mI 1979), when a
debtor files under Chapter 11, a secured party is automatically prevented from repossessing
or selling the debtor's property, actions it could take under state law. This stay will remain
in effect if the trustee can show, among other things, that the secured party is "adequately
protected." See Bernstein, Commercial Lenders and the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,
60 CHI. B. REc. 336, 338-42 (1979).
26 When a debtor corporation is reorganized, a secured creditor may be forced to ex-
change its security interest for its "indubitable equivalent" or give up its right to take pos-
session of the collateral in exchange for a lien on the collateral to the extent of its "allowed
amount." The power of the bankruptcy court to force the secured creditor to give up its
rights under state law is called its "cram down" power. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1111, 1129 (Supp.
111 1979); Blum, The "Fair and Equitable" Standard For Confirming Reorganizations
Under the New Bankruptcy Code, 54 Am. BANKR. L.J. 165 (1980); Klee, All You Ever
Wanted to Know About Cram Down Under the New Bankruptcy Code, 53 AM. BANKR. L.J.
133 (1979). For a general discussion of the new Chapter 11, see Trost, Business Reorganiza-
tions Under Chapter 11 of the New Bankruptcy Code, 34 Bus. LAw. 1309 (1979).
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of-credit transaction, however, the burden of giving notice and the
risks the secured creditor faces in bankruptcy are in fact borne by
one of the parties to the transaction-the bank. In this part I ex-
amine whether this shifting of costs should make any difference
that is relevant in terms of bankruptcy principles. I do this by
comparing the standby letter-of-credit transaction with one that
provides the same protection to the beneficiary and that clearly
survives the trustee's attack in bankruptcy. This is the transaction
in which the beneficiary obtains a security interest in the property
of the debtor in its own right in addition to a standby letter of
credit from the bank. I conclude that these transactions differ only
because in the former, the bank, not the seller, extends credit to
the debtor.
A. Letters of Credit as a Financing Device
The court in Twist Cap asserted that honoring a letter of
credit after the debtor files for bankruptcy allows a general credi-
tor to enjoy the benefits usually reserved for secured creditors.2 7
The beneficiary, however, differs in a crucial respect from an ordi-
nary general creditor in that it bargained for special treatment
before the ninety-day preference period preceding the debtor's
filing, 8 just as a party that secures its debt does. If the benefi-
ciary's bargain is not to be enforced when the secured party's is,
the two situations must be distinguished. To illustrate, I focus on a
single fact situation involving the sale of a piece of equipment.
A seller owns a high-speed digital computer with a value of
one million dollars, but it wishes to purchase another more suited
to its current needs. It has found a buyer for its old computer, and
(to keep the example simple) both parties want an outright sale.
An important element of their bargain will be the method of pay-
ment. Cash payment, of course, would be simplest, but the buyer
may not have the purchase price in cash, and its bank may not be
willing to lend it that amount. For its part, the seller may be cash
rich and have no immediate need to be paid in full. If it were will-
ing to defer payment, the seller could, in principle, fully protect
itself with a purchase money security interest in the computer.
The seller then would have priority with respect to the computer
217 Twist Cap, Inc. v. Southeast Bank, 1 Bankr. 284, 285 (Bankr. D. Fla. 1979).
11 On the 90-day preference period, see part IV-A infra.
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over all other creditors,2 9 and its security interest could not be set
aside by a trustee in bankruptcy if the buyer became insolvent.30
In practice, however, this arrangement might leave the seller
insufficiently protected. The computer might depreciate at a rate
faster than the buyer's payments, making the right to repossess an
imperfect protection. To protect itself, the seller might seek a se-
curity interest in other property of the buyer, but other secured
parties might have priority over it. Moreover, although the bank-
ruptcy petition does not destroy a secured creditor's rights, the au-
tomatic stay and cram down powers of the trustee can disrupt
them 31 Because of these risks, the seller might seek additional pro-
tection by introducing a third party into the transaction.
A third party can decrease the seller's risks by cosigning the
buyer's promissory note as a guarantor. If the third party who is
willing to bear the risk that the buyer will default is a bank, how-
ever, it must issue a standby letter of credit rather than a guaran-
tee.3 2 Before issuing such a letter, the bank usually requires its cus-
tomer (the purchaser of the computer) to grant it a security
interest in property to which it will have recourse if it is forced to
pay on the letter and the customer is unwilling or unable to reim-
burse it.
Twist Cap raises the issue whether such a security interest
should survive an attack by a trustee in bankruptcy under its pow-
ers to void preferences and postpetition transfers.3 In resolving
this question, it must be recognized that a well-advised bank can
avoid the Twist Cap problem almost entirely by restructuring the
transaction. In addition to retaining a security interest for itself,
the bank can insist that the seller as well retain a security interest
that it must assign to the bank if it draws on the letter. A formal
" See note 21 supra.
o The trustee's power to avoid transfers such as the giving of a security interest does
not extend to transfers for contemporaneous consideration, but only to transfers for antece-
dent debts. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c) (Supp. 1 1979).
31 These powers prevent the secured creditor from extricating itself from a deal that
has soured, forcing it to pin its hopes of recovering its money on the uncertain fortunes of
the rehabilitated debtor. See notes 25-26 supra.
3, Banks typically are not authorized to guarantee the obligations of others. See Lord,
The No-Guaranty Rule and the Standby Letter of Credit Controversy, 96 BANKING L.J. 46
(1979). In some jurisdictions such acts are ultra vires. E.g., New Jersey Bank v. Palladino, 77
N.J. 33, 39 n.2, 389 A.2d 454, 457 n.2 (1978) (interpreting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:9A-253 (West
1963)); see Arnold & Bransilver, The Standby Letter of Credit-The Controversy Contin-
ues, 10 U.C.C. L.J. 272, 281-83 (1978).
33 Twist Cap, Inc. v. Southeast Bank, 1 Bankr. 284, 285 (Bankr. D. Fla. 1979). For these
trustee's avoidance powers, see 11 U.S.C. §§ 547, 549 (Supp. II 1979).
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assignment is not even necessary. Under principles of equitable
subrogation that were expressly incorporated into the Bankruptcy
Code, 4 the bank would step into the seller's shoes when it honored
the letter and would be able to assert against the insolvent buyer
whatever rights the seller had.3 5
If the bank had no security interest in its own right, this
transaction could not be attacked as a voidable preference or a
postpetition transfer, because the assignment of a security interest
between two creditors does not involve a "transfer" by or for the
benefit of the debtor.36 The bank should be in no worse a position
if, in addition to being the assignee of the seller's security interest,
it also held one of equal or lesser scope in its own right. Even after
Twist Cap, the most cautious analysts still think that such trans-
actions are safe from the trustee's attack.3 7
Why should the bank that relies solely on its own security in-
terest be treated differently from the bank that honors a standby
letter of credit and asserts a security interest through the benefi-
ciary? The security interest in the first transaction is no more
"unearned" than the security interest in the second, because in
both the bank bargained for its special rights. The bank could have
charged more for issuing the letter and forgone the protection of a
security interest; conversely, if some other bank had offered to is-
sue the letter of credit for the same fee but did not insist on a
security interest, the parties could have transacted with it. The
parties gave the bank the security interest because both found it in
their interest to do so. We therefore should focus not on whether
the bank's advantage is "unearned," but rather on the narrower
question of what costs this arrangement imposes on third parties.
11 U.S.C. § 509(a) (Supp. 1I 1979) provides that "[e]xcept as provided in subsections
(b) and (c) of this section, an entity that is liable with the debtor on, or that has secured, a
claim of a creditor, and that pays such claim, is subrogated to the rights of such creditor to
the extent of such payment."
35 See Mickelson v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. (In re J.V. Gleason Co.), 452 F.2d 1219, 1222,
1224 (8th Cir. 1971) (surety equitably subrogated to rights of mechanic's lienors after paying
their claim against debtor).
3' Transfers of security interests do not create voidable preference problems because
they do not affect the rights of other creditors. See text and note at note 55 infra. Some
courts have suggested recently, however, that an assignee's rights on reorganization may
differ from the assignor's. E.g., Drubner v. Gaslight Village, Inc., 8 Bankr. 866, 871 (Bankr.
D. Conn. 1981).
1' See N. Baron, supra note 10.
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B. Third-Party Costs of the Bank's Security Interest
As others have noted,38 security interests impose costs on third
parties. These costs alone, however, do not justify setting aside a
security interest. The survival in bankruptcy of security interests
perfected before the debtor became insolvent has been a feature of
American bankruptcy law throughout this century. Congress care-
fully evaluated the balance between secured and general creditors
in bankruptcy when it enacted the Code in 1978, and it preserved
the principle that security interests entered into for contemporane-
ous consideration are not voidable preferences."
The proper inquiry must examine the unique benefits that the
bank enjoys in a letter-of-credit transaction at the expense of other
creditors when it asserts its own security interest in the debtor's
property in addition to or instead of the beneficiary's security in-
terest. The bank's security interest can differ from that usually as-
serted by a seller in two respects: the filing that perfects the inter-
est and the priority that the bank consequently enjoys. These
differences, however, stem from the parties' decision to have the
bank, rather than the seller, bear the risk of the buyer's default.
The bank's security interest does not resemble the typical security
interest in that its obligation is contingent, but no principle of
bankruptcy justifies treating the bank worse than if its extension
of credit to the buyer had not been contingent. Indeed, the Bank-
ruptcy Code, both in its treatment of contingent claims against a
debtor's estate40 and in its express indorsement of subrogation
rights,41 suggests that contingent claims are to be treated in the
same way as fixed claims. A closer examination of the differences
in filing and priority makes this conclusion clear.
1. Filing Differences. When the bank protects itself through
the seller's security interest, a creditor considering a loan to the
debtor can find the seller's name in the filing system. In contrast, if
the bank enjoys the security interest directly, the seller's name will
not appear on the financing statement at all. In fact, if the debtor's
bank already has made a secured loan to him, the bank's original
" See Schwartz, Security Interests and Bankruptcy Priorities: A Review of the Cur-
rent Theories, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 2 (1981).
" See 4 COLLIER ON BANKRuPTcY 547.20, at 547-71 to -73 (15th ed. 1981).
40 11 U.S.C. § 101(4)(A) (Supp. IH 1979) provides that "claim" means the "right to
payment, whether or not such a right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated,
fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or
unsecured."
41 See id. § 509(a); text and note at note 34 supra; text at note 65 infra.
1982]
The University of Chicago Law Review
filing may have been broad enough to encompass the new security
interest without a new filing.42 One may doubt, however, that the
absence of the seller's name in the financing statement affects
third parties any differently than the absence of much other infor-
mation in a notice filing system.
In a filing system like that of Article 9 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, a financing statement conveys to the potential credi-
tor only enough information to put it on notice that property of
the debtor may be encumbered.43 If a creditor found that a bank
had a first-priority security interest in all of a debtor's property, it
would know to ask the debtor to reveal all of its dealings with the
bank. It also could ask the debtor to have the bank verify a list of
all the claims its security interest presently secured." The bank's
contingent liability on the letter of credit would appear on such a
list.45 The information available to the potential creditor about this
transaction is not different from that available about all others be-
tween the bank and the debtor. In fact, if a bank issues standby
letters of credit to several different sellers on behalf of one debtor,
other creditors may be better off than they would be if each seller
had obtained a security interest in its own right. In the former
case, the potential creditors need to require the debtor to have the
bank verify one list, whereas in the latter case, they must ask the
debtor to have each of the sellers verify a different list. Nothing in
the filing requirements mandates treating contingent claims differ-
ently from fixed ones.
42 For example, the financing statement may indicate simply that the collateral consists
of "all personal property of the debtor, now existing or hereafter acquired." The bank's
subsequent agreement to secure the issuance of a standby letter of credit does not require a
new filing. U.C.C. § 9-312. But see Coin-O-Matic Serv. Co. v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co.,
3 U.C.C. Ran. 1112, 1120 (R.I. Super. Ct. 1966) (applying the 1962 version of the U.C.C.).
43 U.C.C. § 9-402(1) provides that:
A financing statement is sufficient if it gives the names of the debtor and the se-
cured party, is signed by the debtor, gives an address of the secured party from which
information concerning the security interest may be obtained, gives a mailing address
of the debtor and contains a statement indicating the types, or describing the items, of
collateral.
For a general discussion of notice filing, see 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 23, §§ 15.1-.3. Note
that requiring the listing of the secured party's name and address does not give a potential
creditor any right to obtain information from the secured party directly. See id. § 15.3, at
472. As Professor Gilmore notes, "[t]here is no reason why a secured party should be put to
the cost and burden of preparing detailed statements of his affairs to satisfy the curiosity of
officious intermeddlers, business competitors or the student editors of law reviews." Id.
44 U.C.C. § 9-208.
"5 The bank's failure to include the contingent liability would deprive it of the right to
enforce the security interest against persons misled by its failure to comply. Id. § 9-208(2).
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2. Priority Differences. Of perhaps greater significance is the
priority position of the bank. If the bank already has a security
interest in the debtor's property, the priority of its new security
interest arising from the letter-of-credit transaction may relate
back to the date of the filing of the bank's original financing state-
ment, if the property being used as collateral is covered by the
original statement's description. 46 If the seller had not dealt with
the buyer previously and created its own security interest, it would
have a first priority only to the extent of its purchase money secur-
ity interest. For all other property, the seller's security interest
would be subordinate to all those filed previously.' Thus, by hav-
ing dealt with the debtor before, the bank might enjoy a higher
priority, at the expense of third parties, than it would if the seller
had obtained the security interest in its own right and assigned it
to the bank.48
This favorable position, however, does not stem from the fact
that the bank used a letter of credit to cover the risk of the buyer's
insolvency. Such a commitment does not differ in principle from a
loan of money to the buyer to pay for the seller's goods. The bank
bears the same default risk in both transactions. In both cases, the
bank is better positioned than other creditors. Because it has dealt
with the debtor previously, the bank finds it easier to evaluate the
credit risk. Because of the first-to-file rule, the bank's debt will be
better secured than later creditors' debts..9 Although these advan-
tages make this bank more willing to issue the letter of credit than
a bank that has not dealt with the debtor previously, this willing-
ness does not arise from any features unique to the letter of credit.
The bank would enjoy these advantages regardless of the structure
of the transaction.
46 The priority of a security interest depends not on when the security interest attached
or was perfected, but on when the financing statement was filed. This is known as the "first-
to-file" rule. Id. § 9-312(5).
47 This is also a result of the first-to-file rule.
48 The bank's priority extends only as far as its original filing gave notice of its security
interest. U.C.C. § 9-204(3). At the time of the filing, the debtor need not have owned the
particular piece of property in which the bank's security interest is later asserted, as long as
the financing statement contained an after-acquired property clause. See id. §§ 9-204,
-312(7). Even with an after-acquired property clause, however, the bank usually will not
enjoy priority over later purchase money lenders. See id. § 9-312(2)-(4). Thus, it is possible
that, if the seller has a purchase money security interest, the bank would be better off as-
serting the seller's security interest (as it clearly can) than its own.
4 On the principles underlying the Code's priority rules, see Jackson & Kronman,
supra note 23, at 1167-75.
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In summary, the bank with a security interest in the debtor's
property in a standby letter-of-credit transaction gains no advan-
tages at the expense of other creditors that are attributable to the
use of the letter of credit. Because the bank has no priority over
others when it honors the letter of credit unless it has validly filed
under Article 9, creditors cannot complain of inadequate notice.5
Notice in the case of a standby letter of credit is as effective as it is
in any other context. Similarly, the nature of the letter-of-credit
transaction does not provoke the objection that the transaction
may give the bank a better priority position than if the seller es-
tablished its own security interest and transferred it to the bank.
In the standby letter-of-credit transaction, the bank-not the
seller-bears the risk of the debtor's insolvency. Consequently, the
rights of the seller should not determine the rights of the bank.
Rather, the bank's priority position should be no different from
that it would have enjoyed had it simply made a loan to the buyer
directly.
III. THE TRUSTE'S POWER TO ENJOIN PAYMENT
The conclusion that standby letters of credit in principle
should survive in bankruptcy does not answer the more fundamen-
tal statutory question: whether the new Bankruptcy Code gives the
bankruptcy trustee the power to enjoin payment of drafts under
letters of credit and to avoid security interests that arise in letter-
of-credit transactions. This part examines the trustee's authority
under the Code to enjoin payment; part IV will explore its power
to avoid the bank's security interest.
Even if one were to conclude that a bank that had honored a
letter of credit could not successfully assert a security interest in
the debtor's property, it does not follow that the honoring of a let-
ter of credit should be enjoined. 1 It is axiomatic that letters of
credit represent obligations of the bank completely independent of
the underlying transaction.2 Outside of bankruptcy, courts enjoin
payment on letters of credit only when there is outright fraud in
50 This is true of the secured creditor's rights in bankruptcy. Outside of bankruptcy a
secured creditor prevails over a general creditor even if it has failed to file. U.C.C. § 9-301.
51 See Newport Bank v. Herkimer Bank, 225 U.S. 178, 185-86 (1912) (distinguishing a
guarantor's honoring of its obligation to a third party from the rights of the debtor's estate
and the guarantor against one another; holding the former not a voidable preference, even
though the third party was paid off in full).
52 See text and notes at notes 16-20 supra.
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the letter-of-credit transaction itself.53 Parties that bargain for a
letter of credit assume that regardless of war, revolution, or other
catastrophe, the letter will be honored when the documents speci-
fied in the letter are presented.5 4 Under letter-of-credit doctrine,
the beneficiary of the letter need not concern itself with how the
customer induced the bank to issue the letter in the first instance.
It need look no further than the bank's own trustworthiness.
General principles of bankruptcy reinforce the independence
of the bank's obligation to honor drafts in a letter-of-credit trans-
action from its rights against its now insolvent customer. Even af-
ter a bankruptcy petition is filed, creditors remain free to transact
among themselves. The bank's honoring of the letter of credit is
such a transaction, because it benefits the seller at the expense of
the bank without changing the size of the debtor's estate or affect-
ing the claims of other creditors. It would not be a voidable prefer-
ence under the old bankruptcy law, because the transfer does not
diminish the fund to which creditors of the same class can resort
for payment of their debts.5
53 See U.C.C. § 5-114(1) ("An issuer must honor a draft or demand for payment which
complies with the terms of the relevant credit regardless of whether the goods or documents
conform to the underlying contract for sale or other contract between the customer and the
beneficiary."); id. § 5-114(2) (a court may enjoin honoring a letter of credit when documents
are "forged or fraudulent or there is fraud in the transaction").
"Fraud in the transaction" might include a situation in which the documents describing
a shipment of goods are facially in order, but the shipment consists of garbage. See, e.g.,
Sztejn v. Schroder Banking Corp., 177 Misc. 719, 722, 31 N.Y.S.2d 631, 634-35 (Sup. Ct.
1941). "Fraud in the transaction" in the context of a standby letter of credit might include
cases in which the beneficiary of the letter prepared a document that was fraudulent-for
instance, one stating that another party was in default when it was not.
Whether there was fraud in the transaction is the most frequently litigated issue involv-
ing letters of credit. It was recently the focus of controversy in a case of standby letters of
credit in favor of the government of Iran. See KMW Int'l v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 606
F.2d 10, 15 n.3, 16 (2d Cir. 1979); Note, "Fraud in the Transaction". Enjoining Letters of
Credit During the Iranian Revolution, 93 HARv. L. REv. 992 (1980). Throughout this article
I assume that there has been no "fraud in the transaction" on the part of the seller and that
an injunction under letter-of-credit doctrine is therefore inappropriate.
" See KMW Int'l v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 606 F.2d 10, 16 (2d Cir. 1979) (Iranian
revolution) ("There is nothing in the U.C.C.. . . which excuses an issuing bank from paying
a letter of credit because of supervening illegality, impossibility, war or insurrection."). The
Second Circuit in KMW, however, did find it had the equitable power to require the bank to
give three days' notice to the customer before honoring the letter, so that the customer
could determine whether the documents complied with the terms of the letter or were
fraudulent. Id. at 17.
" See Kapela v. Newman, 649 F.2d 887, 892 (1st Cir. 1981); Farmers Bank v. Julian,
383 F.2d 314, 327 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1021 (1967); Walker v. Wilkinson, 296 F.
850, 852 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 265 U.S. 596 (1924); 3 COLLMER ON BANKRuPTcy, supra note
39, 60.20, at 859-60 (14th ed. 1977).
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Nothing in the Code brings this well-established principle of
bankruptcy into question. Section 362 of the Code provides that
the filing of the bankruptcy petition automatically stays "any act
to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the es-
tate." 56 If a bank's honoring of a creditor's draft under a letter of
credit created or perfected its security interest as against the
debtor, the automatic stay would enjoin it. Honoring the letter,
however, does neither. The security interest of the bank "attaches"
under Article 9 when the security agreement is executed, when the
debtor has rights in the collateral, and when the secured party
gives "value. ' 57 The security interest is "perfected" when, in addi-
tion to these steps, a financing statement has been filed.55 The exe-
cution of the security agreement, the filing of the financing state-
ment, and the debtor's obtaining rights in the collateral are events
in the bank's control that take place before the petition is filed.
One might argue that perfection occurs only when the seller's
drafts are paid, because only then does the bank give value. But
the definition of "value" under the relevant section of the Uniform
Commercial Code is broad e.5  The bank's binding obligation to
honor the letter of credit is itself the giving of value.60 Thus, the
security interest is perfected before the petition is filed and before
the automatic stay provision takes effect.
One could argue, however, that the state law governing the at-
tachment does not determine the moment of "creation" of a secur-
ity interest under section 362 and that the security interest is not
created for bankruptcy purposes until the bank's liability is no
longer contingent. In that case, the automatic stay could still pre-
vent payment under the letter of credit. Such an interpretation of
5 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (Supp. III 1979) provides that "[e]xcept as provided in subsection
(b) of this section, a petition filed under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title operates as a
stay, applicable to all entities, of . . . (4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien
against property of the estate."
57 U.C.C. § 9-203(1)-(2).
" Id. § 9-302. Filing is sometimes unnecessary for perfection. See, e.g., id. §§ 9-302 to
-306.
" Id. § 1-201(44) provides:
Except as otherwise provided. . . a person gives "value" for rights if he acquires them
(a) in return for a binding commitment to extend credit or for the extension of immedi-
ately available credit whether or not drawn upon and whether or not a charge-back is
provided for in the event of difficulties in collection; or
(b) as security for or in total or partial satisfaction of a pre-existing claim; or
(c) by accepting delivery pursuant to a pre-existing contract for purchase; or
(d) generally, in return for any consideration sufficient to support a simple contract.
60 See Prisbrey v. Noble, 505 F.2d 170, 176 (10th Cir. 1974).
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section 362 is countertextual, however, because it puts the date of
creation after the date of perfection. More importantly, interpret-
ing the honoring of a letter of credit as creating a security interest
furthers no principles of bankruptcy law. As long as the stay pre-
vents any enforcement of the bank's security interest (as it clearly
does), the debtor's interests are not compromised if the letter is
honored. Because the purpose of the automatic stay is to protect
the debtor from undue pressure in the wake of bankruptcy,"' "cre-
ation" under section 362(a)(4) is most persuasively limited to situ-
ations in which new security interests, including those created by
old creditors, are entered into after the petition is filed.
Section 549 of the Bankruptcy Code, which authorizes the
trustee to "avoid a transfer of property of the estate . . that oc-
curs after the commencement of the case," 2 might be interpreted
as giving the trustee power to enjoin the bank from honoring the
letter of credit. This argument assumes that the transfer of the
security interest from the debtor to the bank occurs when the bank
actually pays the draft under the letter, not when it bound itself to
pay it. But even if the state law governing the attachment and
perfection of security interests does not determine the moment of
transfer under federal bankruptcy law, it is more sensible to read
section 549 as giving the trustee the power to render the security
interest unenforceable rather than the power to enjoin the honor-
ing of the letter of credit. It should be a 'matter of indifference to
the trustee whether the bank suffers from an unenforceable secur-
ity interest or the beneficiary suffers from an unenforceable letter
of credit.
The court in Twist Cap erred in asserting that the bank's
honoring of the letter of credit "would certainly be counterproduc-
tive to the debtor's efforts to obtain rehabilitation." ' s The mere
transfer of money from one claimant against the debtor's estate to
another cannot affect the debtor's rehabilitation. An injunction
would only disrupt the fundamental and long-established principle
governing letters of credit-that the bank's obligation to pay is in-
dependent of the underlying transaction.
1 See S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 54-55 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CoDE
CONG. & AD. NEws 5787, 5840-41.
" 11 U.S.C. § 549 (Supp. HI 1979); see note 77 infra.
6 Twist Cap, Inc. v. Southeast Bank, 1 Bankr. 284, 285 (Bankr. D. Fla. 1979).
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IV. THE TRUSTEE'S POWER TO AVOID THE BANK'S SECURITY
INTEREST
The most difficult question raised by Twist Cap is whether the
trustee in bankruptcy can prevent the bank from enforcing its se-
curity interest once the letter of credit is honored. The question is
difficult not only in terms of statutory construction, but also in
terms of its possibly broad effect. More than the right of the bank
that issues standby letters of credit is at stake. If a security inter-
est supporting the bank's contingent obligation to pay the seller
cannot survive in bankruptcy, neither should a security interest as-
serted by a guarantor or other party contingently liable for the
debts of the buyer. Because guarantors figure in many commercial
transactions," and because they frequently retain security inter-
ests, it is unlikely that Congress meant to deny them the rights of
secured creditors on the ground that their obligations were contin-
gent. That obligations are contingent does not mean they are in-
substantial. The Bankruptcy Code expressly acknowledges this by
recognizing contingent claims and rights of subrogation.e5
Two sections of the Bankruptcy Code arguably give the trus-
tee in bankruptcy the power to prevent the bank that has honored
its letter of credit from enforcing its security interest. Section 547 6
allows the trustee to avoid preferential transfers within ninety days
before the filing of the bankruptcy petition. Section 54967 allows
the trustee to avoid postpetition transfers of the debtor's property.
I examine these sections in turn.
A. Voidable Preferences
Whether the trustee can set aside the bank's security interest
for a letter honored before the petition was filed is a straightfor-
ward question under section 547, which allows the trustee to avoid
certain transfers "of property of the debtor. . . for or on account
of an antecedent debt. . . made. . . on or within 90 days before
the filing of the petition.""" There cannot be such a voidable pref-
A common example is the case where a parent corporation guarantees loans made to
its subsidiary.
" See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(4), 509(a) (Supp. IH 1979).
Id. § 547; see note 68 infra.
67 11 U.S.C. § 549 (Supp. HI 1979); see note 77 infra.
68 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (Supp. DI 1979) provides in fulh
Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, the trustee may avoid any
transfer of property of the debtor-
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erence unless the "debt" is incurred before the "transfer." If this
section is to authorize the trustee to void the bank's security inter-
est, there must have been a preexisting debt to the bank and a
transfer of the security interest within the ninety-day preference
period.
Under the new Bankruptcy Code, a debt "means liability on a
claim," 9 and "claim" encompasses a "right to payment, whether or
not such right is. . .contingent. 7 0 When the bank agrees to issue
a letter of credit, it exacts an enforceable right to payment that is
contingent on the letter being drawn upon. A debt therefore exists
when the bank and its customer enter into their security agree-
ment and the bank issues the letter, even if none of the other steps
necessary for attachment or perfection have taken place.
Thus, if the bank has filed a financing statement before the
preference period, the threshold question remains whether transfer
takes place when there is attachment and perfection under state
law or when the bank's liability ceases to be contingent.7 1 The
(1) to or for the benefit of a creditor;
(2) for or on account of an antecedent debt owed the debtor before such transfer
was made;
(3) made while the debtor was insolvent;
(4) made-
(A) on or within 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition; or
(B) between 90 days and one year before the date of the filing of the petition,
if such creditor, at the time of such transfer-
(i) was an insider; and
(ii) had reasonable cause to believe the debtor was insolvent at the time
of such transfer; and
(5) that enables such creditor to receive more than such creditor would receive if-
(A) the case were a case under chapter 7 of this title;
(B) the transfer had not been made; and
(C) such creditor received payment of such debt to the extent provided by the
provisions of this title.
If the bank's security interest is transferred only when it honors the letter of credit, require-
ments (1), (3), and (5) probably are satisfied. Because the bank is a creditor, requirement (1)
clearly is met. Requirement (3) probably is met because the debtor is presumed insolvent
during the 90-day preference period. Id. § 547(f). Because the bank would be an unsecured
creditor in the absence of the transfer of the security interest, the transfer probably would
improve its position so as to satisfy requirement (5).
9 Id. § 101(11).
70 Id. § 101(4)(A); see note 40 supra.
71 The First Circuit has held that the date of transfer of a security interest relates back
to the date of the agreement. Torrech Nieves v. Maryland Cas. Co., 373 F.2d 510, 511 (1st
Cir. 1967) (decided under the old bankruptcy law) (not explicitly addressing the voidable
transfer problem). The First Circuit recognized, however, that the authority was split. Id.;
cf. Gray v. Travelers Indem. Co., 280 F.2d 549, 554 (9th Cir. 1960) (holding that conditional
assignment of contract right relates back to the time of agreement, but noting the split of
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security interest is voidable only in the latter case. Federal bank-
ruptcy law is built on a foundation of state law property rights.
Unless federal bankruptcy interests require some alteration of
these rights, they persist when asserted in a bankruptcy pro-
ceeding.72
Under section 547(e), a transfer is made "at such time such
transfer takes effect between the transferor and the transferee" if
the transfer is perfected within ten days and if the debtor already
has rights in the property transferred. 3 Under state law, the trans-
fer takes effect when the parties enter into the security agreement
and the bank issues the letter, which is well before the debtor be-
comes insolvent.7 ' No special policies of section 547 commend find-
ing the moment "transfer takes effect" to occur at any other time
than as state law provides.
Section 547 protects general creditors from being unfairly dis-
advantaged by last-minute transfers by the debtor on the eve of its
authority).
72 See Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 54-55 (1979):
The Bankruptcy Act does include provisions invalidating certain security interests as
fraudulent, or as improper preferences over general creditors. Apart from these provi-
sions, however, Congress has generally left the determination of property rights in the
assets of a bankrupt's estate to state law. Property interests are created and defined by
state law. Unless some federal interest requires a different result, there is no reason
why such interests should be analyzed differently simply because an interested party is
involved in a bankruptcy proceeding.
Of course, Congress has the power to define the moment of transfer as it pleases. See
Countryman, The Use of State Law in Bankruptcy Cases (pt. 2), 47 N.Y.U. L. Rsv. 631,
632 (1972). Congress has done this in the context of security interests in after-acquired
property. 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(3) (Supp. III 1979). In the absence of any exercise of such
power, however, state law definitions of when property rights arise should control. See 2 G.
GILMORE, supra note 23, § 45.2, at 1284.
13 11 U.S.C. § 547(e) provides in part:
(2) For purposes of this section, except as provided in paragraph (3) of this sub-
section, a transfer is made-
(A) at the time such transfer takes effect between the transferor and the
transferee, if such transfer is perfected at, or within 10 days after, such time;
(B) at the time such transfer is perfected, if such transfer is perfected after
such 10 days; or
(C) immediately before the date of the filing of the petition, if such transfer is
not perfected at the later of-
(i) the commencement of the case; and
(ii) 10 days after such transfer takes effect between the transferor and
the transferee.
(3) For the purpose of this section, a transfer is not made until the debtor has
acquired rights in the property transferred.
" See text and notes at notes 56-60 supra.
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demise." In letter-of-credit transactions, however, neither the
debtor nor the bank controls the timing of the bank's claim to the
debtor's property, because the claim arises when the beneficiary
forces the bank to pay under the letter. The default of the debtor
does trigger the beneficiary's right to payment, but such a default
hardly can be called a "preference" in favor of the bank. The bank
is better off if the default never takes place and the letter is never
called upon.
One might argue that the default is a preference in favor of
the letter's beneficiary. The debtor's deliberate default might seem
no less a preference than a decision by a debtor to pay a general
creditor in cash. Either action brings about full satisfaction of the
claim and depletes the debtor's estate by a corresponding amount.
But there is a crucial difference: under a letter of credit, the bene-
ficiary is ultimatelypaid regardless of the actions of the debtor. If
the debtor defaults, the beneficiary is paid through the letter of
credit. If not, the beneficiary is paid in the ordinary course of the
underlying commercial transaction. The debtor can choose how the
creditor is paid, but it cannot determine whether it is paid. Thus,
no act of the debtor during the ninety-day period "prefers" the
beneficiary. Like a secured creditor, it is "preferred" only because
of a binding agreement publicly noted in a financing statement
prior to the ninety-day period. Such "preferences" do not offend
the policy of section 547 of preventing last-minute manipulations
by the debtor for the benefit of some creditors at the expense of
others.7 6
75 See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 177-78 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5963, 6138. In addition to ensuring that creditors share equally in
the debtor's estate, section 547 ensures that the debtor is not "dismembered" in a last-
minute rush to obtain liens on the debtor's property. Id. The security interest arising from
the letter of credit does not result from any last-minute race to the courthouse, of course,
but from a bargain that preceded that debtor's insolvency.
7' The debtor's inability to manipulate its affairs to benefit one of its creditors distin-
guishes the bank's security interest from security interests in after-acquired property. In
enacting section 547, Congress passed special rules to handle cases like Grain Merchants v.
Union Bank & Sav. Co., 408 F.2d 209, 214-15 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 827 (1969),
which protected a creditor's security interest in property acquired in the 90-day preference
period when all other steps for protecting the security interest had taken place outside the
period, because these "floating liens" are subject to debtor manipulation. The debtor that
wants to favor the holder of the floating lien can deliberately build up the asset to which the
lien attaches. Instead of paying off trade creditors, for example, it could build up its inven-
tory. Such last-minute favoritism is not possible in the letter-of-credit transaction, because
the letter's beneficiary structured the transaction so that it is paid, regardless of the debtor's
actions.
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B. Postpetition Transfers
Whether the bank can enforce its security interest if it honors
the beneficiary's draft under the letter of credit after the filing of
the bankrutpcy petition also turns on the moment of transfer, al-
though section 5497 rather than section 547 controls. We might
turn for guidance on this question to section 502(e)(2) 78 which
mandates that a claim for reimbursement that becomes fixed after
the filing of the petition be treated as if the claim had become
fixed before the filing.79 Section 502, however, says nothing about
when a transfer of property securing a contingent liability occurs;
it says only that the "claim" (whether secured or not) must be
treated as if it arose before the petition. Moreover, section 502 is
expressly subject to the voidable-preference powers of the trustee
under sections 547 and 549.80
I have argued that none of the principles underlying section
547 commend finding a transfer at the moment the bank's contin-
gent liability becomes certain;"' the same is true of section 549.
Section 549 prevents creditors from gaining unilateral advantages
at the expense of other creditors after the filing of the petition, just
as section 547 prevents such misbehavior before the filing. In a let-
ter-of-credit transaction, however, the obligation for which the
bank claims a security interest arose long before the petition. The
7 11 U.S.C. § 549(a) (Supp. III 1979) provides:
Except as provided in subsection (b) and (c) of this section, the trustee may avoid a
transfer of property of the estate-
(1) that occurs after the commencement of the case; and
(2)(A) that is authorized under section 303(f) or 542(c) of this title; or
(B) that is not authorized under this title or by the court.
Subsections (b) and (c) are inapplicable: subsection (b) explicitly does not apply to transfers
that secure a debt, and subsection (c) concerns judicial sales of real property.
8 U.S.C. § 502(e)(2) (Supp. III 1979) provides:
A claim for reimbursement or contribution. . . that becomes fixed after the com-
mencement of the case shall be determined, and shall be allowed under subsection (a),
(b), or (c) of this section, or disallowed under subsection (d) of this section, the same as
if such claim had become fixed before the date of the filing of the petition.
7' In the House debate on the new Bankruptcy Code, Representative Edwards appears
to have contemplated a surety with a security interest in the debtor's property when he
discussed the effect of section 502(e)(2). See 124 CONG. REc. H11,094 (daily ed. Sept. 28,
1978). The remarks are not completely clear, however. See 3 COLLIER ON BANKRupTcY, supra
note 39, 502.05, at 502-80 n.15 ("[T]he comment suggests a difference between the advan-
tage to the surety where the claim is secured or unsecured, depending upon the facts. The
comments themselves, however, use the word 'secured' in both instances, an obvious error in
some fashion.").
80 11 U.S.C. § 502(a) (Supp. II 1979).
81 See text and notes at notes 71-76 supra.
Standby Letters of Credit
bank's claim on property in the debtor's estate arose while the
debtor was solvent, and it was noted properly in a public filing. We
do not confront a deal made by the bank, beneficiary, and debtor
after the petition was filed.
Arguably, section 549 also ensures that the debtor's status is
frozen at the moment of bankruptcy. Except as the provisions of
the Code governing the administration of the estate permit, parties
are not allowed to alter the size of the debtor's estate. Under this
view, if the bank has no vested interest in the debtor's property
before the petition is filed, it should not have one afterwards,
except as the Bankruptcy Code specifically allows.82 Finding a
"transfer" in an act beyond the bank's control would be appropri-
ate, according to this interpretation, because it preserves the status
quo.
The Bankruptcy Code as a whole, however, does not reveal a
policy to exclude contingent liabilities to keep the debtor's estate
stable. Though section 502 does not address the question of when a
transfer occurs, it does recognize explicitly the need to accommo-
date contingent liabilities.8 " Nothing in the Code suggests that a
debt should be relegated to an inferior status merely because it is
contingent.
Moreover, the consequences of honoring a letter of credit
should be the same under sections 547 and 549 lest awkward
problems of consistency arise. The beneficiary of the letter may
choose when to present its draft to the bank, and might do so after
the bankruptcy petition is filed even if it acquired the right to pre-
sent it earlier. If honoring the letter before the petition did not
give rise to a voidable transfer but honoring it after the petition
did, the beneficiary could control the bank's chances of ultimate
repayment.
CONCLUSION
This article has examined the questions raised by the Twist
82 11 U.S.C. § 549(a)(2)(B) (Supp. II 1979) supports this view by defining the scope of
the trustee's avoidance power negatively, excluding from that power transfers specifically
authorized by the Bankruptcy Code.
Id. § 502(c) provides:
There shall be estimated for purpose of allowance under this section-
(1) any contingent or unliquidated claim, fixing or liquidation of which, as the
case may be, would unduly delay the closing of the case; or
(2) any right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach
gives rise to a right to payment.
1982]
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Cap case. I have argued that Twist Cap is wrongly decided and
that it unnecessarily throws into doubt the validity of a useful
commercial financing device. A bankruptcy court should never en-
join a bank from honoring a letter of credit on the ground that
honoring the letter would lead the bank to assert a security inter-
est in the debtor's property.14 The bank's obligation to the benefi-
ciary under the letter of credit is independent of the transaction
between the bank and its now insolvent customer and affects
neither the debtor's estate nor other creditors. Whether the bank
can enforce its security interest after it honors the letter of credit
is a more difficult question. On balance, however, the most natural
and sensible interpretation of the relevant sections of the Bank-
ruptcy Code is that, when a contingent liability is at issue, a secur-
ity interest is "transferred" when the security interest attaches and
is perfected under state law.5 When attachment and perfection
under state law take place more than ninety days before bank-
ruptcy, the bank's security interest should survive the trustee's
attack.
It can assert, however, the debtor's right to enjoin payment if there are forged or
fraudulent documents accompanying the seller's draft or if there is fraud in the transaction.
See note 53 supra.
" State law controls, except, of course, for security interests in after-acquired property.
See 11 U.S.C. § 547 (Supp. 1I 1979); note 76 supra.
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